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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The officers in this case, viewed in the totality 
of the circumstances, had reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
defendant was engaged in criminal activity, when the defendant's 
vehicle turned around and fled from the roadblock. Therefore, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15, the officers were entitled 
to stop the defendant's vehicle, in order to investigate the matter 
further. 
2. The defendant committed various traffic offenses in 
the presence of the officers. A reasonable police officer would 
have stopped the defendant's vehicle for those violations. Therefore, 
the stop was also proper under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-
2, incident to those traffic violations. 
3. Even if this Court should find that the initial stop 
was improper, the State was not permitted by the Court below to 
introduce any evidence of matters which occurred after the stop 
itself, including consent to search the vehicle. Therefore, this 
case should be remanded to the Circuit Court to make findings with 
respect to consent to search the vehicle; and, if it finds that 
such consent was voluntarily given, the Motion to Suppress should 
be denied, because such consent would purge any taint of illegality 
from the stop itself. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's factual evaluation underlying 
its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, 
since the trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the witnesses' credibility. ... However, 
in reviewing the trial courtf s legal conclusions 
based on those findings, we afford no deference 
and apply a_ correction of error standard. 
(Emphasis added.) State v. Arroyo, 102 U.A.R. 
34 (Utah App. 1989) at 34-35. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE. 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court held that an investigatory stop of a vehicle can be constitution-
ally justified on one of two alternative grounds: 
First, it could be based on specific, articulable 
facts which, together with rational inferences 
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude [the defendant] had committed 
or was about to commit a crime. ... 754 P.2d 
at 975. 
In State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986), in discussing 
probable cause for a vehicle search, the Utah Supreme Court observed 
as follows: 
The validity of the probable cause determination 
is made from the objective standpoint of a "prudent, 
reasonable, cautious police officer... guided 
by his experience and training." ... Police 
officers by virtue of their experience and training 
can sometimes recognize illegal activity where 
ordinary citizens would not. Some recognition 
should appropriately be given to that experience 
and training where there are objective facts 
to justify the ultimate conclusion. ... 731 
P.2d at 1088. 
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In State v. Elliott, 626 P.2d 423 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a case where the officer received a report 
that two persons, driving a vehicle with out-of-state plates, were 
trying to sell tires and auto parts at drastically reduced prices. 
When the officer attempted to pull the vehicle over, the defendants 
fled. The officer had previously recovered a stolen vehicle under 
similar circumstances. The Court found that, under these facts, 
there were sufficient articulable facts and inferences to justify 
the stop of the defendant. In addition, the Court found: 
...([T]he flight of defendants) also tends to 
validate the arrest under [former section 77-
13-3 (3), now codified at Utah Code Annotated 
Section 77-7-2 (3)]. It is true that flight 
in the abstract is not sufficient to constitute 
probable cause for arrest. However, when flight 
is coupled with a_ reasonable belief that the 
suspect is involved in criminal activity, there 
exists probable cause for arrest. (Emphasis 
added. ) 626 P.2d at 427. 
In defendant's Brief, it is claimed that the officers 
in this case could not articulate any objective facts to support 
a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal acti 
First, it is clear that the officers observed defendant turn around 
and flee from the roadblock. Sheriff Judd has had experience as 
a law enforcement officer, in dealing with cars which turn around 
and flee from roadblocks. That experience helped to form the basis 
of his suspicion that the defendant was involved in criminal activi 
pursuant to the reasoning set forth in State v. Dorsey, cited above 
However, the trial court refused to permit Sheriff Judd to testify 
about that experience, as a basis for his reasonable suspicion. 
(Tr., pp. 11-16, 38-39) The State submits that the Court erred 
in excluding that proffered evidence, and that such error should 
be corrected by this Court under the "correction of error" standard 
of review applicable in this case. If that evidence is deemed to 
be admissible by this Court, it helps to form the basis for reasonable 
suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle in this case. 
Second, contrary to the claim made in defendant's Brief, 
the record reflects that the Sheriff clearly articulated the following 
reasons for stopping the defendant's vehicle: (1) the lateness 
of the hour; (2) the lack of any other traffic; (3) the flashing 
lights at the roadblock; (4) the abrupt stop of the vehicle, when 
it came upon the lights at the roadblock; (5) the turn-around on 
the crest of the hill, as soon as the driver noticed the roadblock; 
and (6) the turn-around in the middle of the road, on a narrow mountain 
road, rather than at a turn-out or some other, safer place. 
1. In defendant's letter of supplemental authorities dated March 
21, 1989, submitted under Rule 24 (j), Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, reference is made to Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 
743 P.2d 1299 (1987). That case sustained the constitutionality 
of a roadblock sobriety checkpoint in California, an issue which 
is not before the Court in this case. However, it is interesting 
to note that, just as in this case, cars which avoided the checkpoint 
would be stopped, if, in avoiding the checkpoint, the driver did 
anything unlawful, or exhibited obvious signs of impairment. 743 
P.2d at 1309, fn. 5. 
Defendant's letter of supplemental authorities also cites 
State v. Crary, No. CRA 83-32, a 1983 case out of the Third District 
Court in Salt Lake County. That Court relied on Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-1-17; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); an Arizona 
case which has since been clarified (see, State v. Superior Court, 
143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (Arizona 1984)); and State v. Cole, 
674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983). In view of the development of the law 
in the numerous cases decided in this area by the appellate Courts 
of this State during the five (5) years since that decision by the 
District Court, its precedential value at this point would appear 
to be negligible, at best. 
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Pursuant to State v. Elliott, cited above, the fact of defendant's 
flight,coupled with the foregoing specific, articulable facts, would 
lead any reasonable police officer to suspect that the defendant 
was engaged in criminal activity, in light of his training and ex-
perience . 
This is not a case involving a so-called "pretext" stop, 
such as this Court recently found in State v. Baird, 94 U.A.R. 40, 
763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988), where the stop was based on the 
officer's testimony that there was "something funny" about the license 
plate sticker on the vehicle; or in State v. Sierra, cited above, 
where the stop was based on the defendants' out-of-state license 
plates,"suspicious nature", and reaction to the officer. Instead, 
this case is much more akin to State v. Johnson, 104 U.A.R. 34 (Utah 
App. 1989), where this Court recently found reasonable suspicion 
that a vehicle was stolen, where the owner of the vehicle was absent, 
and the defendant was unable to produce the registration for the 
vehicle. This Court found that Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-
15 permitted the officer to conduct further investigation, and the 
same conclusion should be reached in this case. 
The State respectfully submits that the facts of this 
case, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, should lead 
this Court to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to stop 
the defendant's vehicle in this case. Therefore, the conclusion 
by the Circuit Court that there was no reason to suspect criminal 
activity in this case is clearly erroneous, and the Order Suppressing 
Evidence should be reversed by this Court. 
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POINT II: THE STOP WAS INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS. 
The second basis for justification of a vehicle stop, 
under State v. Sierra, cited above, is where the stop is incident 
to a lawful citation for a traffic violation. In Sierra, this Court 
held: 
A police officer may, however, stop an automobile 
for a traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence. ... 
In determining whether a stop for a traffic 
violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext, 
the totality of the circumstances governs.... 
In making this determination the subjective 
intent of the officer is irrelevant. ... 
Thus, in determining whether [the officers1] 
stop of [the defendant] for [traffic violations] 
was an unconstitutional pretext, we focus on 
whether a_ hypothetical reasonable officer , in 
view of the totality of the circumstances, ... which 
have stopped [the defendant ] t_o issue a. warni~ng 
for [the traffic violation]. The proper inquiry 
does not focus on whether the officer could 
validly have made the stop. ... (Emphasis added.) 
754 P.2d at 977-78. 
In his Brief, defendant claims that no traffic violations 
occurred prior to the stop of defendant's vehicle. On the contrary, 
in the Circuit Court, the State extensively briefed and argued the 
application of Utah Code Annotated Sections 41-6-13, 41-6-13.5, 
and 77-7-2, at the roadblock; and the trial Court was also entitled 
to take judicial notice of the fact that a car turning around on 
the crest of a hill, on a narrow mountain road, could be in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-67, pursuant to Rule 201, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. In addition, defendant's vehicle failed to stop 
in response to the red light from the pursuing posse vehicle, and 
took evasive action, on the way back to Panguitch, and once it arrived 
in town, thereby committing separate and independent traffic violations 
under Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5. Thus, it is clearly proper 
for this Court to conclude that a reasonable police officer would 
have stopped the defendant's vehicle in this case, unlike Sierra. 
Cf. State v, Arroyo, 102 U.A.R. 34 (Utah App. 1989). 
This case is much like State v. Elliott, cited above, 
where the Court found that, in addition to the fact of the defendants' 
flight, coupled with reasonable suspicion, the officer had grounds 
to arrest the defendant for various public offenses committed in 
his presence, including reckless driving, littering, failure to display 
a safety inspection sticker, and failure to stop at the officer's 
signal, any one of which would have been sufficient. 626 P.2d at 
427. 
The State respectfully submits that, in consideration of 
the totality of the circumstances, from the time the defendant's 
vehicle turned and fled from the scene at the roadblock, and took 
evasive action, both on the way back down to Panguitch, and in Panguitch, 
until actually stopped, a reasonable police officer would have observed 
various traffic violations committed in the officer's presence; 
and, under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2, would have had grounds 
to stop the defendant's vehicle in this case, incident to those 
traffic violations, and search the same. See, State v. Ayala, 762 
P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1988). Therefore, the State respectfully submits 
that the Circuit Court erred in concluding to the contrary, and 
that the Order Suppressing Evidence should be reversed by this Court. 
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POINT III: EVEN IF THE ORIGINAL STOP WAS IMPROPER, DEFENDANT'S 
CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS VEHICLE PURGED ANY TAINT OF ILLEGALITY. 
In State v. Sierra, cited above, even though it found 
the initial stop to be illegal, this Court then considered whether 
the defendant's consent to search the vehicle was sufficient to 
purge the stop of illegality. Because the record in Sierra was 
not clear on that point, this Court remanded the case back to the 
trial court for a determination of whether the consent to the search 
was voluntary. 754 P.2d at 981. 
Sierra was decided by this Court on May 18, 1988. On 
July 19, 1988, this Court handed down its opinion in State v. Aquilar, 
758 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988). In that case, in reliance upon Sierra, 
this Court found that the defendant had voluntarily consented to 
a search of his vehicle; and, therefore, that the question of the 
propriety of the stop need not be addressed, because the consent 
purged the taint of any prior illegality. 758 P.2d at 458-59. 
Finally, on February 15, 1989, this Court decided State 
v. Arroyo, 102 U.A.R. 34 (Utah App. 1989). In that case, even though 
this Court found the original stop to be improper, the Court then 
determined that the defendant's subsequent voluntary consent purged 
the taint of illegality from the original stop, and that the motion 
to suppress should not have been granted. 102 U.A.R. at 35. 
In this case, as in Arroyo, after objection by defense 
counsel, the Circuit Court denied the State an opportunity to intro-
duce any evidence relating to matters that occurred after the defendant's 
vehicle was stopped, including the issue of consent to search. 
(See, e.g., Tr. , pp. 52-53; 85-89) Consequently, the record is 
not clear, nor did the Circuit Court make any findings, with respect 
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to the issue of consent to search the defendant's vehicle. 
Furthermore, this issue was not clearly defined under 
Utah law at the time the suppression hearing was held in this case 
on March 17, 1988. This Court decided Sierra, Aquilar, and Arroyo 
all after that hearing was held. Therefore, without prior direction 
by the appellate courts of this state as to the relationship between 
consent searches and vehicle stops, this point could not realistically 
have been raised by the State prior to this appeal. See, State 
v. Babbell, 103 U.A.R. 14 (Utah 1989). 
In view of the foregoing circumstances and time frame, 
and in reliance upon State v. Sierra, the State respectfully submits 
that, even if this Court finds the original stop to be improper, 
this Court should remand the case back to the Circuit Court to determine 
the issue of consent to search the defendant's vehicle; and, if 
that Court finds that such consent was voluntarily given, then the 
taint of the illegal stop would be purged, and the Motion to Suppress 
should have been denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the second Conclusion 
of Law entered by the Circuit Court was clearly erroneous. The 
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15. The stop was also 
proper as incident to traffic violations committed in the presence 
of the officers, under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2. The Order 
Suppressing Evidence should be reversed. 
Finally, the Circuit Court erred in not permitting the 
State to introduce evidence with respect to consent to search the 
vehicle. Therefore, if this Court finds the initial stop to be improper, 
the case should be remanded back to the Circuit Court to make findings 
as to the issue of consent to search the vehicle; and, if such consent 
was voluntarily given, the Order Suppressing Evidence should be 
reversed. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 1989. 
PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Garfield County Attorney 
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